Cheesecake militarism

THE CHINESE held their national day parade yesterday, celebrating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Communist state. This year, they decided to use some different paints from the propagandist’s palette to add spice to an event that usually doesn’t make for compelling television.

As Ben Bland asks in The Asia File:

Was anyone else watching China’s national day parade surprised to see the massed ranks of short skirt and leather boot-clad female soldiers goose-stepping through Tiananmen Square?

I suspect very few people outside China were watching–or inside China, for that matter–and that was probably the point of the exercise.

But if the photo he ran of the parade is any indication, that surprise should turn to delight. The ladies look more like troupers from a chorus line rather than troopers trained for an assault on Hamburger Hill.

Some years ago, a few governments in Europe came up with the PR phrase, “Socialism with a human face” to help push their product. Yes, I know that’s an oxymoron and a tacit admission that the philosophy as practiced lacks humanity, but there’s no contradiction in the footsoldiers of despotism having lovely legs. Besides, the runway for these models was on Tiananmen Square. What better device than the feminine form to prevent our collective memories from revisiting the human slaughter that occurred in precisely the same place 20 years ago? Though the Chinese might be able to censor the Internet, their reach doesn’t extend to YouTube yet.

Note also that Bland says they were “goose-stepping”. It’s an excellent rule of thumb that any country with goose-stepping soldiers has little to offer which anyone other than the Rockettes would want to emulate.

Speaking of unlikely elements combined in the service of celebrating China’s national day, here’s another story from the United States. In recent years, the managers of the Empire State Building have been lighting the edifice once a week in different colors to commemorate the national days of such countries as Canada and India, as well as for other special occasions.

The managers thought it would be a wonderful idea if they lit the building up in red on this red-letter day for the Chinese. That caused more than a few people to see red, and perhaps the faces of the managers to turn red as well.

The link to the story is from Fox News, but the outrage is bipartisan:

New York politicians have paid notice as well, and say they are let down by the light-up. Rep. Anthony Weiner, D-N.Y., said it was a mistake to pay tribute to what he called “a nation with a shameful history on human rights.”

Fox also uses the weasel journalism trick of quoting a university professor to say what they would like to say but aren’t supposed to in a straight news article, though it would be difficult to gainsay this professor’s observations:

“China gets treatment that other dictatorships can only dream of — a free pass on human rights,” said Arthur Waldron, a history professor at the University of Pennsylvania…”China remains strongly oppressive — but we make a lot of money, and we have a tendency to romanticize the country, confusing her brilliant cultural heritage with the current communist regime. Will we light it in honor of Tibet?…Would we have lit the Empire State Building for the USSR knowing what we do about the Gulag?”

Prof. Waldron might be overlooking something when he says “knowing what we do about the Gulag”, however.

I suspect those building managers don’t know much about Tiananmen Square, tens of millions of butchered Chinese, or the Gulag to begin with.

Japan’s political kaleidoscope (2): Aso edition

THE YEASTY FERMENT brewing in the world of Japanese politics is a heady blend with ingredients ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous. Anyone who thinks politics in this country is moribund either isn’t paying attention or their beverage of choice is Kool-Aid. Today’s draft is drawn primarily from the Aso Taro keg.

Politicians say the darndest things

Logorrhea is an occupational hazard for politicians, and all sorts of things come out of their mouths when they’ve switched on cruise control. This is from a recent speech by Prime Minister Aso Taro:

“(The current Japanese national soccer team) doesn’t have a superstar like Nakata Hidetoshi. Eleven people working together—that’s Japanese soccer. If Japan had a superstar, it would be His Majesty the Emperor.”

Do you ever wonder how Mrs. Aso would answer if someone asked her whether her husband talks like this when they’re relaxing together at home?

Then again, if the idea of Jesus Christ Superstar can sell millions of albums, launch productions on Broadway and the West End of London, generate two films with a third planned, and still be performed on stage 35 years later, it should be harmless for some Japanese to consider the tenno to be the local superstar.

Why people dislike journalists #4,937

Journalists defend themselves from the charge of pointlessly repeating the same question by saying it’s their job. Well, yes, for some people, working for a living does involve creating make-work projects designed to convince the boss you’ve got the situation well in hand. All they usually accomplish, however, is to waste the time of people with more productive things to do. Try this dialogue from a recent Aso Taro press conference:

Reporter: First, about the personnel for senior party positions and the Cabinet…

(Mr. Aso leans back and smiles)

Reporter: Last Saturday you had a discussion with Mr. Kuroda (LDP secretary general), and at that time you took a negative approach to making major personnel changes. You said, “I’ve never talked about it; it’s just outsiders making things up.” Could you tell us again what your thoughts are about the personnel issue?

PM: I haven’t thought about personnel.

Reporter: Does that mean you won’t think about personnel until the Diet is dissolved and there’s a general election?

PM: It means I’m not thinking about it now.

Reporter: Now.

PM: Now look, you’re jumping on everything I say as soon as I say it, and you also did it not long ago. This sort of thing…saying these needless things will just lead to a pointless conversation, so let’s drop the subject…well, that was a close call (laughs).

Reporter: I see.

PM: (Clear voice) I haven’t thought about it.

Reporter: OK. Next…

PM: Do you understand?

Reporter: You’re not thinking about it all?

PM: (Laughs, doesn’t answer)

Update: Well, it looks like this reporter knew more than I gave him credit for. The very next day, Mr. Aso said that he had been thinking for a while about “the most suitable people at the most suitable time”. Nevertheless, it should have been obvious he didn’t want to answer the question when he was asked. That’s no reason to bug the man.

Why would Mr. Aso double back on his word so quickly? Some television journalists speculated that former PM Abe Shinzo, a long-time Aso friend, had been urging him to reshuffle his Cabinet and had nearly convinced him. But then party bigwig Mori Yoshiro told Mr. Aso not to waste his time.

How typical: Mr. Aso’s lack of decisiveness and willingness to listen to either of those men for political advice are two of the reasons his popular support is negligible to begin with.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the latest teacup tempest in an administration known for them is that one of the TV journalists casually commented that “he lied” the first time before moving on to comment about subsequent developments.

That does not speak well of contemporary Japanese politics at the highest level, does it?

Grated Aso

A lower house election must be held within the next few months, and it looks very much like the LDP is going to be trounced, allowing the opposition Democratic Party of Japan to form a government for the first time. The ruling party no longer offers a coherent political philosophy, and their post-Koizumi prime ministers have been the politically clumsy manipulated by the terminal klutzes behind the scenes.

It’s no wonder then that some senior party members want to move up the September election for LDP party president (who would become prime minister) to find an alternative to going down with Mr. Aso and the rest of the mudboat crew before the lower house election.

LDP faction leader Yamasaki Hiraku (AKA Taku) has submitted a petition to LDP MPs and other party members specifically calling for an early election. He also set up a special area on his website for citizens to provide their input.

Said Mr. Yamasaki:

“It’s not (designed) to bring down the Aso Cabinet”.

It is to laugh. No one believes that, particularly because the special area materialized on his website the day after the LDP candidate was defeated in the election for Chiba City mayor. A former Cabinet minister also admitted off the record that the idea is to create a popular consensus to replace Mr. Aso.

Indeed, Mr. Yamasaki later quit beating around the bush. A week ago, he claimed he had 108 signatures from lower house LDP members, though he wasn’t showing them to anyone. That’s about halfway to his goal of signing up an outright majority of LDP MPs in the lower house. He says that would prevent Mr. Aso from calling a snap election out of petulant frustration.

Then came the release of the following poll:

• People intending to vote for the LDP: 16.4%
• People intending to vote for the DPJ: 40.4%

A 24-point differential causes alarm bells to ring so loudly even those with earplugs can hear them. It also tends to shake up senior party leaders with heretofore safe seats because an electoral tsunami that large could just as easily wipe them out as it would the small fry in marginal districts.

The secretaries-general

Said Kato Koichi at a press conference:

In my 37 years as a diet member, I have never seen the reputation of the LDP sink as low as it has now. It’s the lowest it’s ever been. Calling an election now would be an act of suicide…Some MPs say we can take only 165 seats, but I think that outlook is too optimistic.

Said Takebe Tsutomu to reporters at party headquarters:

“We (Diet members) will work hard until the end of the term on 10 September, (but) we should have a showdown in the election with new policies promoted by a new leader.”

Ibuki Bunmei was slightly more optimistic, if optimistic is the word to describe a prediction of the loss of the party’s lower house majority:

“The cabinet support rate has fallen. We could have taken 241 seats with New Komeito, but now that will only be 220 to 230.”

All four of these gentlemen have served as LDP secretary-general, the top position in the party apparatus, so they know when electoral defeat is staring them in the face. Another former SG, Nakagawa Hidenao, has been saying the same thing every day for months now.

The names that arise most frequently as possible replacements are the Acting Secretary-General (i.e., representative) Ishihara Nobuteru, the son of Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro; Health, Labor, and Welfare Minister Masuzoe Yoichi, a former University of Tokyo professor who won public favor as a TV commentator slamming bureaucrats for their handling of public pensions; and former Defense Minister Koike Yuriko, a favorite of the Koizumian wing of the party, but disliked by some for a perceived shallowness of loyalty to the LDP. The problem with all three is that none of them are strong enough on their own to serve in that role without substantial help from the old boys in the backroom, most of whom have been out of touch for a generation.

Not everyone has jumped on the dump Aso bandwagon, however. Those who think they can swim–or cling to the flotsam and jetsam–when the ship sinks include former postal rebel Noda Yumiko and former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. Mr. Abe may be a man of principle and party loyalty, but he is sorely deficient in the third P of political acumen.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura Takeo is also opposed to a change:

“Party unity is of the utmost importance before the lower house election. Turmoil in the party will cause its own downfall. Would the people really understand if we only changed the leader? How would we answer the criticism that holding a party leadership election before the general election was done only with the general election in mind?”

Yes, the people would understand if you removed a leader they don’t support who lacks a firm political touch. They’d probably sympathize with you, in fact. To answer the carpers, you could always point out that the parties sitting in the opposition rows don’t get to make policy.

New Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partners, also want to stick with the loser. Said a senior official:

“It will have a negative impact on the election for governor in Shizuoka and the Tokyo Metropolitan District council. It’s also possible the voters would not support (the coalition) in the lower house election.”

You mean the same voters who already favor the opposition over the coalition by a 24-point margin? Those voters?

The official dropped hints the party would withhold support from LDP Diet members who tried to oust Mr. Aso.

It doesn’t seem to have occurred to them that candidates running behind a party leader promoting regional devolution, delinking from the mandarins of the civil service, putting the nation’s finances in order before raising taxes, continued privatization, and a resolute foreign policy probably wouldn’t need New Komeito support to win.

Naturalists speak of the cornered prey summoning all its energy for a desperate counterattack. Some hunters, however, know that cornered prey tracked for a long time often become too tired and dispirited to continue, and willingly surrender. What else could be the explanation for those people who are ready to fight an election campaign led by Mr. Aso—a man who has demonstrated no leadership ability, is not amenable to the reforms the public knows are needed, and who thinks that promising a large tax increase will earn the party public favor?

Mr. Aso might even be among those willing to surrender to the hunter. He’s dropping hints that he’ll hold the lower house election in August. Was this done to forestall a putsch? Was it his idea, or did someone put him up to it?

Why is it that the dimmest bulbs invariably think they’re the brightest?

Taro and the pirates

But let’s be fair: Mr. Aso does have his moments. The Diet recently passed a bill that allows Japanese self-defense forces (i.e., the military) to be sent overseas with the authority to fire on pirate vessels overseas if they do not respond to an order to cease and desist their attacks—even on non-Japanese ships—and allows Japan to participate in joint international anti-piracy operations. It also criminalizes piracy, which permits the offenders to be apprehended and punished in Japan.

Yet the DPJ chose to potentially sacrifice Japanese lives and ships by refusing to pass the bill in the upper house. They and the other opposition parties delayed the measure for two months and forced the LDP to use its supermajority in the lower house to get it through.

Said the prime minister:

“Naturally you’d protect yourself if you were attacked by thieves. I don’t understand (their opposition to the use of weapons). What are they thinking about when it comes to the safety of the Self-Defense Forces and the Coast Guard?”

There have been about 150 pirate attacks on shipping off Somalia this year, already exceeding the 111 attacks in 2008. What was the opposition “thinking”? For starters, the DPJ and the Social Democrats were concerned that the bill allows the Cabinet to send the SDF overseas without Diet approval.

Well, their two-month foot-dragging and gamesmanship while piracy continues unabated demonstrates why waiting for the approval of more than 700 people in both houses of the legislature, many of whom are all too willing to create artificial political crises to delay bills on any pretext, is unwise and possibly fatal when real world circumstances demand prompt action.

Meanwhile, the SDP and the Communists think the Coast Guard should be the only military forces involved against the pirates, and called into action only in Japanese territorial waters. They were also opposed to the relaxed rules on the use of weapons. What do they think works against Third World pirates looking for a multi-million dollar payday? Moral suasion? Do they expect the Somalians to start raiding along the Seto Inland Sea?

Let’s be clear: Many in the DPJ supported this bill as it was. That meant it could have sailed through the upper house with little or no problem, but the party leadership felt compelled to object. That’s partly because they lack the political sophistication to understand that for critical areas of national interest, it really is OK to agree with the government and not to oppose something merely because they’re the opposition. It’s also because they chose again to ignore the national interest by playing a numbers game for their own political ends and ally with the SPD solely to bring down the government.

What this demonstrates:

1. The SPD hold their countrymen in such contempt that they believe Japanese are still too irresponsible to be trusted with lethal weapons overseas in matters of self-defense. (It’s also possible that the wool in their heads has grown so thick they’re no longer capable of coherent thought.) That, combined with their other positions, past associations with North Korea, their socialist/Marxist background (which includes circumstantial evidence linking a leading party figure to the Japanese Red Army terrorist group of yesteryear) reveals serious character flaws.
2. That the DPJ would put to risk Japanese lives, commercial interests critical for an island nation with limited natural resources, and nascent efforts to show that the country is a responsible international partner willing to help enforce the basic concepts of right and wrong, solely to feed the fantasies of miniscule fringe parties for the sake of gaining power, is another sign that they are too immature to successfully lead a government.
3. Communists always behave like Communists.

Want more? DPJ President Hatoyama Yukio was asked if he would roll back the decision if they gained a lower house majority and formed a government later this year. You know, if you’re opposed, you’re opposed, right? His answer:

“We will not make a hasty decision to do an immediate about-face.”

Bless their pointed little heads, but aren’t they dependable? The DPJ can always be counted on to choose expediency over principle.

Some claim the DPJ maintains its alliance with the SPD because it “needs them” in the upper house.

“Needs them” for what? It’s not as if the SPD is going to start voting with the LDP if the DPJ tells them to bugger off.

The Democratic Party of Japan—still shameless after all these years.

Getting real

During the same discussion, Mr. Aso continued:

“It’s the same with North Korea. At a minimum, we must fight when we should fight. If we aren’t prepared to do that, we won’t be able to defend the nation’s safety.”

Added current LDP Secretary-General Hosoda Haruyuki in a Yurakucho speech:

“Who knows what North Korea, which has nonchalantly abducted hundreds of people, will do if they develop nuclear weapons? We must apply more pressure to North Korea. Our ultimate objective is to bring about a collapse of the current regime and have the country be reborn as a peaceful state. The DPJ’s response to (this issue) is extremely soft.”

And why not? Who better than the Japanese to understand that a malevolent regime can become a peaceful state?

Messrs. Aso and Hosoda aren’t the only ones tired of the international pussyfooting. The aforementioned Koike Yuriko resigned last week from the chairmanship of a special LDP committee studying the question of enemy military bases. A party council submitted a statement to Prime Minister Aso on whether Japan should maintain the capability of conducting an attack on enemy military installations. The council adopted a policy of ruling out preemptive defensive attacks, which caused Ms. Koike to walk.

Instrumental in adopting that policy was Yamasaki Hiraku (also mentioned above), who said:

“We must not cause misunderstandings overseas”.

Retorted Ms. Koike:

“A policy exclusively oriented to defense is too restrictive, and a defensive preemptive attack policy is even more restrictive. All we talk about is limiting what we can do. Is it such a good idea to continue to limit Japan’s policies for defense? People say it’s done out of consideration for neighboring countries, but they don’t show any consideration for us at all.”

Bingo. And give that last sentence bonus points.

Duh

The people overseas who might misunderstand could be divided into two groups. The first consists of those in the region who would choose to purposely misunderstand. That would allow them to use Japanese policy as both a diplomatic weapon in bilateral relations, and as a domestic weapon to stir up anti-Japanese sentiment at home. Their feigned ignorance would enable them to continue painting the country as a false enemy, thereby strengthening their base of support.

North Korea threatens Japan with military action every day and has the hardware to make those threats very real. The Chinese are not going to stop until they have made themselves the East Asian hegemon (at least). Russia seized Japan’s Northern Territories after Japan surrendered in 1945 and refuses to return them. South Korea used military force to seize Takeshima in 1954, still illegally occupies the islets, and still refuses international mediation (which Japan says it would accept).

The second group of people who would misunderstand is in the West and principally consists of politicians, academics, and journalists, most of whom can’t be bothered to do the research to get it right to begin with. Perhaps that’s because a real understanding would conflict with their preconceptions.

Japanese diplomatic and military behavior has been the gold standard in Northeast Asia since 1945. Ms. Koike, Mr. Aso, and Mr. Hosoda are right: Japan should choose to defend its legitimate interests as a sovereign nation. The decision-makers in neighboring countries will understand perfectly, regardless of what they say in public for the gullible or the Barnumesque suckers who want to be deceived. As for the people on the other side of the Pacific, there’s a Japanese expression that covers them: Baka ni tsukeru kusuri wa nai. There’s no medicine to cure a fool.

Some people in this country pretended they didn’t understand what Abe Shinzo meant when he said he wanted Japan to move beyond the postwar regime. Well, here you are.

But of course they always knew exactly what he was driving at—they just didn’t want to face the implications. It’s not always easy for adolescents to embrace responsibility and take charge of their lives.

How hot does Kim Jong-il like it?

VERY HOT indeed, if the latest reports are to be believed.

Start with this one from Fox News. It says American intelligence officials have advised their government North Korea will take four steps in response to a new U.N. Security Council resolution condemning their recent nuclear test. The four steps are:

1. Conducting another nuclear test
2. Reprocessing all of their spent plutonium fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium
3. Escalating their uranium-enrichment program
4. Launching another Taepodong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile

An additional American concern is that they’ve lost track of the North Korean missile.

“…(W)here American intelligence officials on June 9 observed components for the long-range Musudan missile leaving the Wapo-ri installation area, they have now “lost track of them,” FOX News has learned.

“We spotted the TELs [Transporter-Erector-Launchers] and then we lost track of them,” a source said. “NGA lost track.”

NGA refers to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a unit the Defense Department that provides imagery and geospatial information for military and civilian purposes.

“It’s disturbing,” the source added.”

It should be more than disturbing, but the Chinese think everyone should just chill out instead. Relax, they say, it’s no big deal. The North’s overall strategy is to pressure the West, rather than start a war, according to this article in the Asia Times.

“North Korea has never abided by any agreement, and tearing up the truce with the South comes as no surprise,” Zhang Liangui, an expert at the Central Party School, which trains communist officials here, told the Southern Weekend newspaper. “This is an act aimed at pressuring the West, and not an indication of an impending military conflict.”

But if the Chinese realize North Korea has never abided by any agreement, why are there six-party talks, and why are the Chinese participating in them? If Pyeongyang intends to pressure the West, presumably the objective is to sign an agreement with the United States to guarantee their continued existence. Meanwhile, the Chinese expect the North to ignore its part of the bargain.

Of course the North will ignore it. Only nations with a sense of morality live up to their obligations.

That same article quotes a Chinese source as saying Beijing believes it can’t deny North Korea nuclear weapons because the North is just following the Chinese route to international respectability:

The outside view that China has the most leverage over North Korea but does not want to exercise it is skewed,” said Zhan Xiaohong, researcher with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. “The North believes that it is simply following China’s example of using military power to gain the international respect it lacks because of its backward economic situation. How could China deny Pyongyang that?”

Zhan points out that in the 1960s China went through a similar period. Emerging from a devastating three-year famine the communist country was desperately impoverished but resolved to develop its nuclear weapons.

“It was the nuclear deterrent that made great powers like the Soviet Union and America take count of China, and it was nuclear power that was able to guarantee the country’s peaceful economic development over the next decades,” said Zhan.

It doesn’t seem to have occurred to Mr. Zhan that North Korea’s adoption of a free market economic system and a democratic political system, as well as ending its international brigandry, would go a lot farther to guarantee the country’s peaceful economic development over the next decades than what they’ve been doing for the past half-century. The formula of the current North Korean system plus the H-Bomb certainly won’t.

There’s more. The Chinese are resisting efforts to include in a UN resolution a measure for the interdiction of suspicious North Korean ships:

China has warned that interdicting ships at sea on suspicion of carrying banned materials could provoke the North into a military response and at the very least discourage it from returning to talks on abandoning its nuclear program.

In other words, allow the country to continue testing its nuclear weapons and exporting nuclear materials to other blackguards around the world. Preventing them from doing so would discourage them from returning one of these days to the six-party talks and maybe signing an agreement they won’t comply with anyway.

Then again, maybe this is just an excuse for the impresario Kim to conduct the Joseon version of Götterdämmerung. The same Asia Times website has recently run two articles from one Kim Myong-chol, a Japanese-born man who retains Korean citizenship. He’s based in Tokyo, but is said to have close ties to the Dear Leader. Here’s how they describe him:

Kim Myong-chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il’s Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Academy of Social Sciences and is often called an “unofficial” spokesman of Kim Jong-il and North Korea.

In this case, “unofficial” spokesman seems to mean propaganda mouthpiece. He’s the head of the Center for Korean-American Peace, and the South Koreans have gone to the trouble to ban his books.

Here’s where we start to get really psychedelic. The first article, dated 21 May, says Kim has gone to Plan B. Who knew there was a Plan A? Well, here are Plan A’s contents as described by the author:

Plan A called for the DPRK to consider exploring a shortcut to enhanced independence, peace and prosperity through rapprochement with the US. Plan A obliged the Kim Jong-il administration to negotiate away its nuclear weapons program as part of a verified denuclearization of the whole of the Korean Peninsula in return for Washington’s strategic decision to co-exist peacefully with Pyongyang.

Plan A assumed the US would decide to leave behind its policy of hostility to the DPRK, conclude a peace treaty with North Korea, and pledge in a verifiable way it would not attack it with nuclear and conventional arms. It also assumed the US would establish full relations with North Korea, show respect for its sovereignty and independence, lift sanctions imposed on it, and provide it with fuel oil and light-water reactors.

Plan A was the engine behind the 1994 Agreed Framework with the Clinton administration and a series of nuclear agreements from six-party talks with the Bush administration, including the September 19, 2005 joint statement, the February 13, 2007 agreement, the October 3, 2007 agreement and the July 12, 2008 agreement.

Despite plan A, the US has remained hostile to North Korea as it is bent on its nuclear disarmament, painting it as a criminal state, and toppling its regime.

There’s some choice language in that passage, isn’t there? Plan A “obliged” the North to negotiate with the U.S., in return for Washington’s “strategic decision to coexist peacefully…establish full relations with North Korea, show respect for its sovereignty and independence, lift sanctions imposed on it, and provide it with fuel oil and light-water reactors.”

Doesn’t the phrase “delusions of grandeur” come to mind. Perhaps it’s time to reissue Leonard Wibberley’s 1955 novel with a new title: The Rat That Roared. (Note that the review called the original “eerily prophetic” in light of recent developments)

So, now that Plan A isn’t working, what’s the deal with Plan B? Take a deep breath:

Plan B envisages the DPRK going it alone as a fully fledged nuclear weapon-armed state, with a military-first policy, and then growing into a mighty and prosperous country. It will put the policy of seeking reconciliation with a tricky US, a helpless superpower with a crippled economy that is losing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, on the back burner.

The DPRK is equipped with all types of nuclear warheads, atomic, neutron and hydrogen, and their means of delivery puts the whole of the USA within effective range….The announced vow to quit six-party talks, restart nuclear facilities and conduct additional nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests is a clear message that the Kim Jong-il administration’s decision to shift to plan B is irretrievable.

Plan B calls for the DPRK to join all three elite clubs of nuclear, space and economic powers by 2012, without seeking improved ties or a peace treaty with the US, as the DPRK has built up an independent global nuclear strike force which can carry the war all the way to the metropolitan US rather than on the Korean Peninsula.

Lest you think that last phrase was just a throwaway line, a new article by the same author at the same site on 12 June is titled Nuclear War is Kim Jong-il’s Game Plan.

Here’s how it starts:

A little-noted fact about the second nuclear test conducted on May 25 by the Kim Jong-il administration of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is that it was a highly successful fission trigger test for multi-megaton warheads.

These types of warheads can be detonated in outer space, far above the United States, evaporating its key targets. This is a significant indication of the supreme leader’s game plan for nuclear war with the crippled superpower and its allies, Japan and South Korea.

Here’s how it continues:

The game plan for nuclear war specifies four types of thermonuclear assault: (1) the bombing of operating nuclear power stations; (2) detonations of a hydrogen bombs in seas off the US, Japan and South Korea; (3) detonations of H-bombs in space far above their heartlands; and (4) thermonuclear attacks on their urban centers.

He says the point of (3) is to render communications and electrical systems inoperable.

Mr. Kim gives us the skinny:

The Yongbyon nuclear site has always been a decoy to attract American attention and bring it into negotiations on a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War. Since as far back as the mid-1980, North Korea has assembled 100-300 nuclear warheads in an ultra-clandestine nuclear weapons program. The missiles can be mounted on medium-range missiles designed to be nuclear capable.

It’s understandable that some would dismiss this as the usual Pyeongyang gasconade, or the latest pathetic chapter of the opéra bouffe staged by the world’s most powerful otaku. After all, who expects North Korea to become an elite economic power by 2012? (Then again, it’s not as if anyone believes the economic projections issued by Western governments, either.)

It might be easy to dismiss Kim Myong-chol as a Northeast Asian version of Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, AKA Comical Ali. He was the Iraqi Information Minister during the American invasion in 2003 who provided information so absurd he became a cult figure for the ironically hip.

But a more compelling view is based on life experience that demonstrates actions speak louder than words. And we’ve seen plenty of actions: testing nuclear weapons and ICBMs, exporting nuclear weapons technology, sharing expertise with Iran and Pakistan, and helping build the facilities for such weapons in Syria. Nothing good can possibly come from any of that. Allowing it to continue means that one day, people are going to be killed in ugly ways for the ugliest of reasons.

It would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that North Korea and their Chinese enablers spot a golden opportunity in the identity, attitudes, and behavior of the current occupants of the White House. About the only Prime Time that group seems to be ready for is a political vaudeville revue hosted by a televangelist. Why should anyone be surprised that Pyeongyang and Beijing are busy trying to make hay while the sun shines? At this rate, they’re likely to wind up with enough to store in the barn for several winters, nuclear or otherwise.

The actions and words of North Korea, China, and the United States are of intense interest to the Japanese–it’s a matter of life and death for them. But Tokyo is still doggedly trying to work with the UN, for the time being.

Some in Tokyo have long wanted to amend the country’s Constitution with its so-called Peace Clause of Article 9. The Preface of that Constitution contains this phrase:

(W)e have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

How much longer do you think it will be before they conclude that’s a sucker’s bet?

Bolton and Hewitt and Stromberg and Steyn on North Korea

EARLIER THIS WEEK we linked to John Bolton’s prescient article in the Wall Street Journal about the then-impending North Korean nuclear test. Mr. Bolton is a magnet for intense criticism of the type that erupts when clearly stated, straightforward views threaten to expose wishful thinking for what it is.

He appeared on the Hugh Hewitt radio program for a half hour on Wednesday to discuss the situation in Northeast Asia in more detail. Mr. Hewitt is a law professor (Constitutional law), website editor, and columnist in addition to hosting his own radio show.

Among the points Mr. Bolton made:

“…the administration is saying that they want, and Secretary Clinton said it again today, they want North Korea back at the six party talks. Now these talks have been underway for six years. They have utterly failed to restrain North Korea. And if you’re sitting in Pyongyang and hearing the administration both before the nuclear test and after the nuclear test say that that’s what they want the next step to be, the only conclusion you can draw on North Korea is that you’re getting a free pass on this test, and on subsequent tests down the road. The six party talks have failed. We need to get over that. Unfortunately, there’s no sign the administration understands it.

In the earlier post, frequent commenter Bender wondered what exactly could be done with North Korea short of a military attack. Mr. Bolton must have been reading the comment section.

First:

I personally think we’d need to stay away from the military option. I think that it’s risky no matter what the level of casualties.

Then:

…we need to take much stronger action against North Korea. I’d put them back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Bush administration never should have taken them off that list. I would once again cut off their access to international financial markets. Here again, the Bush administration had them over a barrel with the Banco Delta Asia matter and let them escape. We need to put those constraints back in. We’ve had a big boost just in the past 24 hours from the government of South Korea announcing it was going to join…the U.S.-led proliferation security initiative, which is a major effort to stop international trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. And we need to put more pressure on China to use its leverage on North Korea either to get rid of Kim Jung Il or at a minimum, to constrain their ability to deal on these nuclear weapons internationally.

More specifically about the Chinese, he said:

The Chinese are concerned that if they put too much pressure on Kim Jung Il, the regime will collapse, and Korea will reunify. Well, here’s the news. Korea will reunify one day just like Germany did. This division of the peninsula is unnatural, and China can either be on the right side of history, or they can continue resisting it. We need to have stronger, more effective advocacy with China to get them to recognize the inevitable, and help us with Kim Jung Il.

But he is not sanguine about the latter:

I think that’s unlikely in this administration. Their priority seems to be climate change negotiations with China. My own view is that nuclear weapons in the hands of a regime like Kim Jung Il are a lot more serious threat to the U.S. and everybody else in the world today than climate change. But if you’re not willing to elevate North Korea’s nuclear program on the list with China, not much is going to happen.

He also discusses the Japanese potential for a nuclear weapons capability:

Many people think (it would take) only a matter of months. They have a very advanced civil nuclear program. They have substantial amounts of spent fuel with plutonium in the spent fuel that could be reprocessed. They have a very sophisticated scientific community. They have advanced missile capabilities now. They can launch their own satellites. So it wouldn’t take Japan long.

At this point, it’s worth taking another look at this report by the Congressional Research Service examining the possibility that the Japanese will acquire nuclear weapons. Here’s some of the advice the American Congress is receiving:

If Japan withdrew from the NPT, it would likely be subject to UN Security Council-imposed sanctions and economic and diplomatic isolation.

Reading this, one wonders how some people manage to stay employed.

The entire transcript of the Bolton interview is here.

Mr. Hewitt, by the way, is very much a fan of the Internet’s non-traditional role in the dissemination of the news. Here’s how he ended an article on the Columbia School of Journalism:

There is too much expertise, all of it almost instantly available now, for the traditional idea of journalism to last much longer. In the past, almost every bit of information was difficult and expensive to acquire and was therefore mediated by journalists whom readers and viewers were usually in no position to second-guess. Authority has drained from journalism for a reason. Too many of its practitioners have been easily exposed as poseurs.

As all of us here know, some of the most easily exposed and fraudulent of the trad journalism poseurs are writing about Japan.

Pre-publication update:

But there are blogs, and then there are the blogs written by the poseurs themselves.

Before this post was scheduled to run, I ran across this blog post by Stephen Stromberg in the Washington Post. I’ve read it at least a half-dozen times, and I still can’t tell for sure if he’s serious.

He suggests that Kim Jong-il made a mistake by conducting the test on the American Memorial Day holiday. Once upon a time, Americans would have realized the implicit danger to its credibility–and therefore its safety–by ignoring the obvious symbolism. Not any more.

Mr. Stromberg seems to think it’s a joke. (Please try to convince me otherwise.) He says that Kim’s test didn’t receive so much attention in the U.S. because it was a three-day holiday weekend, and the American media is more concerned with a Supreme Court justice nominee and the California court’s ruling on gay marriage. Now read this:

This isn’t a frivolous observation. Nuclear weapons are near useless if your adversaries don’t know about and actively fear the ones you’ve got.

Really? The people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki neither knew about nor actively feared the very useful bombs that fell on them.

What was that Hugh Hewitt said about poseurs again?

Mr. Stromberg and the Washington Post think the Obama administration shouldn’t treat this as a crisis. By that, they mean it shouldn’t hasten to offer the Kim Family Regime concessions, as the U.S. has done too often in the past. While the Post’s editorials call for some of the same measures Mr. Bolton did, they also think the nonexistent six-party talks are worthwhile, despite having been an utter waste of time.

I don’t think we have to worry about the too naturally cool Mr. Obama getting too excited. Copping a move from a rap star by pretending to dust off his shoulders, or scratching his nose with his middle finger is more his style. Hey, it worked with Hillary and The Washington Post, didn’t it?

But the poseurs (all of them) miss the point. For some reason, the WaPo seems to think that getting excited = giving North Korea more concessions. The proven equation doesn’t seem to have occurred to them; namely, getting excited = realizing the gravity of the threat and taking immediate steps to eliminate it.

As Mark Steyn points out:

The rest of the world doesn’t observe Memorial Day. But it understands the crude symbolism of a rogue nuclear test staged on the day to honor American war dead and greeted with only half-hearted pro forma diplomatese from Washington.

Still don’t get it?

Out there in the chancelleries and presidential palaces, they’re beginning to get the message. The regime in Pyongyang is not merely trying to “provoke” America but is demonstrating to potential clients that you can do so with impunity. A black-market economy reliant on exports of heroin, sex slaves and knock-off Viagra is attempting to supersize its business model and turn itself into a nuclear Wal-Mart. Among the distinguished guests present for North Korea’s October 2006 test were representatives of the Iranian government. President George W. Bush was much mocked for yoking the two nations together in his now all but forgotten “axis of evil” speech, but the Swiss newspaper Neue Zuercher Zeitung reported a few weeks ago that the North Korean-built (and Israeli-bombed) plutonium production facility in Syria was paid for by Tehran. How many other Iranian clients are getting nuclear subsidies?

So where’s all this leading?

While America laughed at North Korea, Iran used it as a stalking horse, a useful guide as to the parameters of belligerence and quiescence a nuclearizing rogue state could operate within. In…”the post-American world,” other nations will follow that model. We are building a world in which the wealthiest nations on the planet…are all but defenseless, while bankrupt dysfunctional squats go nuclear. Even with inevitable and generous submissions to nuclear blackmail, how long do you think that arrangement will last?

And how long do you think it will be before Japan wises up and gets serious about nuclear weapons now that we know the poseurs in Washington would rather lick their fingers at a backyard barbecue than pay serious attention to some blackhearted men in–yes–an axis of evil preparing to fire up a barbecue of their own.

Kim Jong-il picked a bad news cycle? Poseur doesn’t describe it.

Krauthammer: Convince Japan to go nuclear

THE WELL-KNOWN POLITICAL COLUMNIST Charles Krauthammer thinks the United States should encourage Japan to add nuclear weapons to its military arsenal.

He offers two reasons:

First, North Korea is a nuclear power. What we’ve done to deal with the country hasn’t worked in the past, and won’t work in the future.

Second, a nuclear-armed Japan is not only something for North Korea to think about, but also something for China to think about. North Korea would be unable to do what it’s doing if it weren’t for the enabling behavior of the Chinese. (Indeed, North Korean behavior suits Chinese purposes.) Mr. Krauthammer thinks this would make the Chinese get serious about reigning in their client state.

Yes, Mr. Krauthammer knows about the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. My opinion? Nuclear weapons aren’t a problem if they’re in the hands of responsible states. Japan is, and the three existing nuclear powers in Northeast Asia aren’t.

Here’s another thought: It’s been apparent for some time that a major political realignment is coming in Japan, and that the politicians are waiting until after the next lower house election to begin changing partners.

Until now, most people have focused on the domestic issues that will determine alliances in the future, such as the relationship between the political class and the bureaucracy, and the devolution of authority.

The events of the past week might make international issues in general, and military issues in particular, a factor more visible to the public in determining that realignment than has previously been the case. For example, there are about 50 Diet members more loyal to Ozawa Ichiro than they are to their party, the Democratic Party of Japan. The only policy to which Mr. Ozawa has consistently adhered since the early 1990s is what some even in his own party call U.N. supremacy; i.e., Japan can take no military action unless it is in concert with the United Nations. There are people in the ruling LDP who would find that acceptable, and those in the DPJ who do not.

Are you surprised?

ARE YOU SURPRISED that North Korea conducted another nuclear test? And fired more short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan?

Former American Assistant Attorney General, Undersecretary of State, and UN Ambassador John Bolton wasn’t. Here’s what he said a week ago:

The curtain is about to rise again on the long-running nuclear tragicomedy, “North Korea Outwits the United States.”

Are you surprised at how the current American administration views the issue?:

U.S. Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth said last week that the Obama administration is “relatively relaxed” and that “there is not a sense of crisis.”

Are you surprised that the Japanese and the South Koreans would not be “relatively relaxed” and do have a sense of crisis? They’re taking their complaint to the United Nations, however, which is analogous to phoning the local university’s debating society to tell them about gunshots in the neighborhood.

Are you surprised that the rogue state’s behavior became more roguish after the previous American administration chose dialogue and conciliation in its second term, and that it intensified after the inauguration of the new, blame-ourselves-first administration?

In April, Pyongyang launched a Taepodong-2 missile, and National Security Council official Gary Samore recently confirmed that a second nuclear test is likely on the way. The North is set to try two U.S. reporters for “hostile acts.” The state-controlled newspaper calls America “a rogue and a gangster.” Kim recently expelled international monitors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex. And Pyongyang threatens to “start” enriching uranium — a capacity it procured long ago.

Are you surprised that those two reporters were seized on the Chinese side of the border? And, as the DPRK Studies site notes, the American Secretary of State thinks the young women at Barnard College in downtown Manhattan should get on the Internet and give the North Koreans a piece of their mind?

Are you surprised that the new administration still hasn’t put two and two together yet?

Despite Pyongyang’s aggression, Mr. Bosworth has reiterated that the U.S. is “committed to dialogue” and is “obviously interested in returning to a negotiating table as soon as we can.”

Are you surprised that the North Koreans have spotted what they view as an excellent opportunity to do what they’ve always wanted to do, regardless of what they say? For example, in 2003:

The official Korean Central News Agency said that, although Pyongyang was pulling out of the NPT, it had no intention of producing nuclear weapons.
“Our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity,” Friday’s statement said.

Are you surprised that people are still “committed to dialogue”, despite enough dialogues and broken promises to fill a small library? Again from 2003:

French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said: “It is a serious decision, heavy with consequences”. He is in China for two days of talks on the crisis.

If you start to wonder how heavy those consequences were, remember that M. de Villepin was a poet in his spare time.

The South Korean news agency Yonhap reported that U.S. President Obama telephoned South Korean President Lee and the two leaders agreed to punish North Korea.

Are you surprised that this is what Mr. Obama’s plans call for?:

They agreed to work closely together to seek and support a strong United Nations Security Council resolution with concrete measures to curtail North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities.

Will you be surprised if this month’s visit to the Security Council turns out to be as effective as last month’s visit?

The U.S. and its allies failed to push the 15-member security council to adopt a legally-binding resolution condemning North Korea’s April 5 rocket launch amid strong opposition from Russia and the North’s staunchest ally China.

A presidential statement was issued by the council instead, which called for sanctioning three North Korean firms involved in the trading of weapons of mass destruction and component parts.

Will you be surprised if the DPRK tests an ICBM before the Security Council meets? The Marmot links to a Korean-language report:

South Korea’s NIS, meanwhile, is warning that North Korea may attempt to test fire an ICBM as early as today.

Here’s one that’s no longer surprising: Some people never realize that some approaches never work, while the ones they dislike usually do.

Mr. Bolton repeats a warning he’s been making for some time now:

It’s time for the Obama administration to finally put down Kim Jong Il’s script. If not, we better get ready for Iran — and others –to go nuclear.

If the Obama administration doesn’t put down the Kim Family Regime’s script, don’t be surprised if those others include Japan one day.

UPDATE:
The Asahi Shimbun has just reported that, in addressing the view of some within the ruling LDP that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces need the capability to attack “enemy bases”, Prime Minister Aso Taro said:

“Under the law, we can (attack enemy bases) under a specific, pre-determined framework. It is my understanding that attacks have been allowed since (the period from the mid-50s to the mid-60s).”

The Asahi also notes that the government has not recognized the possession of the weapons themselves to be used to attack another country.

Don’t be surprised if he receives the strong backing of the Japanese people for this stand, regardless of what it says in the Japanese Constitution.

An American view of a nuclear-armed Japan

RICHARDSON OF DPRK STUDIES does us all a favor in this post by bringing our attention to the Congressional Research Service report, Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, (PDF, 16 pages), dated 19 February 2009.

Richardson has a different perspective than ours because he uses his site to follow North Korean affairs, which means that he also closely follows South Korea. Still, he offers these two quotes:

The previous taboo within the Japanese political community of discussing a nuclear weapons capability appears to have been broken, as several officials and opinion leaders have urged an open debate on the topic. Despite these factors, a strong consensus—both in Japan and among Japan watchers—remains that Japan will not pursue the nuclear option in the short-to medium term.

And:

Any eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula could further induce Japan to reconsider its nuclear stance. If the two Koreas unify while North Korea still holds nuclear weapons and the new state opts to keep a nuclear arsenal, Japan may face a different calculation.

The report was written specifically to provide background information to members of the U.S. House and Senate. There are two authors; the first is Emma Chanlett-Avery, identified as a Specialist in Asian Affairs, and the second is Mary Beth Nikitin, cited as an “Analyst in Nonproliferation”. Ms. Chanlett-Avery has written several Congressional reports on Asian issues, though it’s not clear what territory is covered by Asia. (One of her reports was on Southeast Asia.) Ms. Nikitin also has written Congressional reports on non-proliferation.

Despite turgid prose, poor organization, and one serious flaw, the report is worth reading because it provides a basic overview of the many aspects involved, including:

• Japan’s civilian nuclear power program

• The historical background of Japan’s non-nuclear stance and governmental studies for creating a nuclear deterrent.

• What Japan would need (and not need) to develop a nuclear arsenal

• The difficulties in dealing with the substantial bloc of domestic public opinion opposed to nuclear weapons

• The legal restrictions and obstacles to a nuclear program

• The growing sense of nationhood among younger people

• The possible effect on the U.S-Japan alliance, regional security, and Japan’s standing in the world

While most of the report is straightforward, here are some passages that raised my eyebrows:

Regionally, Japan “going nuclear” could set off an arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan.

I doubt that Taiwan would think it necessary to bulk up its military capabilities because Japan had nuclear weapons. China, yes; Japan, no.

Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate a lack of trust in the U.S. commitment to defend Japan.

The Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons would almost certainly be due to a lack of trust in the U.S. committment to defend Japan.

An ascendant hawkish, conservative movement—some of whom openly advocate for Japan to develop an independent nuclear arsenal—has gained more traction in Japanese politics, moving from the margins to a more influential position.

Japan is as likely to start an aggressive war as shrimp are to learn how to whistle, regardless of the definition the authors choose for the word “conservative”. Therefore, the acquisition of the atomic bomb would be strictly as a deterrent, or in only the most dire threat to national security.

The description of this approach as “hawkish” in this context is curious.

…(F)ew dispute that Japan could make nuclear weapons if Tokyo were to invest the necessary financial and other resources.

“Few”? Does anyone dispute it at all?

…(I)f Japan manufactured nuclear warheads, then it would need to at the minimum perform one nuclear test—but where this could be carried out on the island nation is far from clear.

If there was a consensus on pursuing a nuclear program–a very big if–testing might–and that’s a very big might–be performed at an underground location at one of the remote islands to the south. Hatoma, for example, has a population of only 60 people that a determined government could relocate with the approval of an alarmed citizenry. There are other uninhabited islands scattered throughout the archipelago. This is very speculative, of course.

Japan’s nuclear materials and facilities are under IAEA safeguards, making a clandestine nuclear weapons program difficult to conceal.

If Japan felt threatened enough by North Korea or China to build a bomb, why would they want to conceal the program? And in the face of what such a threat would entail, why would they feel constrained by either the IAEA or the need for secrecy? I think the report would have been improved had the authors considered in greater depth the environment required to produce the events they suggest might occur.

Many observers have recognized a trend of growing nationalism in Japan, particularly among the younger generation. Some Japanese commentators have suggested that this increasing patriotism could jeopardize closer cooperation with the United States…

Subtract points for credibility due to the false equivalence of “nationalism” and “patriotism”.

Realist-minded security observers cite the danger of threatening China…

A nuclear deterrent is not a threat to China. Japanese actions in this regard would depend on Chinese behavior, and the leaders of China know it. The leaders of China also think it’s in their best interests to feed their public a different story, however. (Let’s not bring up the North Korean threat; if the Chinese were serious about stopping North Korean nuclear ambitions, Pyeongyang’s program would have ended long ago.)

Perhaps the “realist-minded security observers” might give greater consideration to the more realistic threat of Chinese nuclear weapons and ever-growing armed forces to Japanese security.

If Japan withdrew from the NPT, it would likely be subject to UN Security Council-imposed sanctions and economic and diplomatic isolation.

The only reason Japan would withdraw from the NPT would be due to a serious external threat that it was convinced the UN and the U.S., among others, were incapable of dealing with. Under that scenario, if the UN were to impose sanctions and economic and diplomatic isolation–which haven’t worked so well with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea–global security conditions would have become so perilous that Japan would probably need nuclear weapons.

Acquiring nuclear weapons could also hurt Japan’s long-term goal of permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council.

Japan isn’t going to become a permanent member until the South Korean state reaches diplomatic adulthood, which means not in the foreseeable future.

Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.

As well they should be.

To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race. The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program.

It wouldn’t “compel” South Korea to develop its own program, but the current state of South Korean nationalism–not patriotism–would demand it. Just because Japan did it.

The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors.

“Most observers”? Did they count the observers? Whom do they consider to be “observers”, and why? The authors tend to be vague throughout with their use of expressions such as these, despite what appears to be some lightness in the footnoted material.

Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have (a) damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs.

The United States and its European allies haven’t been very successful in convincing states with malevolent intent to remain non-nuclear. If it isn’t clear to the authors by now that nothing the Americans do (short of total warfare) will convince North Korea to give up its weapons programs, it never will be.

The first justification, by the way, is one cited by the Obama Administration for its sophomoric efforts to outlaw nuclear weapons. As George Jonas points out here, that is potentially more dangerous than anything a hawkish, conservative nationalist would do: “The genie is out of the bottle; good luck to anyone trying to stuff it back.”

The serious flaw of this report is that it assumes the existence of a marvelous policy control panel with hundreds of switches, and the operation in question is to turn only that switch marked “Japanese nuclear weapons” to the ON position. But that switch will not be turned on unless the current position of many other switches in the imaginary control panel also change; that much should be obvious. What, therefore, is the point of examining a single switch in isolation? One would have hoped the authors of Congressional reports were more imaginative when examining hypothetical scenarios.

The full report is here.

Matsuri da! (105): The festival for manly men

DESPITE THE INTENSE COMPETION that is often part of Shinto festivals, which can range from events resembling ad hoc sporting events to those that look like shrine-authorized street rumbles, few of the matsuri have a martial air. One exception is the yabusame festivals, during which archers mounted on galloping horses fire arrows at targets as they race by.

A manly man and his manly men

Another exception is the Lord Shingen Festival, one of the largest in Kofu, Yamanashi. That annual event is held in early April near the anniversary of that manly man’s death on the 12th. The event honors the life and times of the local daimyo, Shingen Takeda, who was quite the 16th century warlord and the city’s founder. He strutted his ruthless stuff during the bloody Warring States period in Japanese history, which means he didn’t fight by Marquis of Queensbury rules. He reached the top by knocking off his predecessor—his father—and then spent the rest of his 52 years war-gaming for real through various military campaigns.

We don’t know whether it was the genes or the Yamanashi water, but Shingen’s eldest son was a chip off the old block who plotted to accelerate his own succession. Dad, having traveled down that road himself, sensed what was afoot and had the lad confined to quarters. Number one son died under mysterious circumstances two years later. Perhaps he should have considered himself lucky. When Shingen discovered a similar plot by his cousin, he ordered the man to cut his belly open on the spot.

Shingen is sometimes referred to as The Tiger of Kai for his mastery of the battlefield, Kai being the name of his ‘hood in those days. But the daimyo had a sensitive side as well, and during his youth he was known for writing excellent poetry.

Kofu spares no effort to recreate his history in its 450-year time slip to those glorious days of yesteryear, when the warriors were brave, courageous, and bold manly men. Replicas of furinkazan, Lord Shingen’s personal flag, are hung throughout the town during the event. The festival is a two-day affair that kicks off with a parade featuring a brass band, musical performances, and a fireworks exhibition. There are also special readings for parents and children of folk tales in which Shingen plays a prominent role, and a lecture titled Takeda Shingen and His Times. The organizers offer a walking tour of local sites associated with the lord that passes through the remnants of the Takeda shrine. Visitors tuckered out after all that walking can relax free of charge at a local hot spring facility. And because the event takes place in early April, they can appreciate the beauty of the cherry blossoms at the former Shingen residence. Perhaps some of them are moved to write poetry of their own.

But the real fun begins on the second and final day. Around 11:00 a.m., twenty-four mounted horsemen wearing the battle dress of Takeda’s generals are joined at Takeda shrine by 1,600 local men dressed as samurai infantry in period costumes, as well as performers of the Shingen dance. They march through the center of Kofu bearing torches and hauling cannon on what is now called Heiwa-dori (Peace Street), just as the proudly non-pacific Shingen and his army did before pushing off for the Battle of Kawanakajima. Along the way, they meet up with a procession of wheeled floats. During the course of the parade, the mounted samurai gallop from Kofu City Hall to the train station. The entire procession stops by the old Takeda Shinto shrine to pray for victory. The festival’s climax occurs in a riverbed at Isawa Kawanakajima during a recreation of the 1561 battle in which Shingen defeated Uesugi Kenshin. The latter was known as the Dragon of Echigo, which suggests that he was a manly man as well, despite his defeat.

Stout-hearted lads they all must have been, but Lord Shingen was no shrinking violet it came to expressing his tender side. The historical archives of the University of Tokyo contain a written love pact signed by Shingen and Kosaka Masanobu, a boy of 16. As part of the love pledge—a samurai pre-nup?—the 22-year-old Shingen swears that he hasn’t and will not dally with another, specifically-named retainer. He also promises that he won’t harm the boy since his intent is a sexual relationship. (This information is derived from Gary Leupp’s Male Colors: The Construction of Homosexuality in Tokugawa Japan.)

Relationships of this sort were common among the manly samurai for several centuries, which presents an interesting parallel with ancient Greece. Some men even encouraged the practice, in part for the benefits that accrued to the younger partners, as they were supposedly given instruction in virtue and the appreciation of beauty. (Another possibility was that it was a workable justification for the seduction of a comely youth.) Thus, as in ancient Greece, the relationship combined the way of the warrior with cultural development. In contrast, some manly men claimed that the love for women caused men to become more feminine. (You could have fooled me, but then again a teenaged boy wouldn’t start bugging his patron to lift up the toilet seat and take out the trash.)

The famous Hagakure, the how-to book for samurai written by Yamamoto Tsunetomo in the early 18th century, even provides some advice for samurai man-boy love:

“A young man should test an older man for at least five years, and if he is assured of that person’s intentions, then he too should request the relationship… If the younger man can devote himself and get into the situation for five or six years then it will not be unsuitable.”

The Japanese term for this practice is wakashudo, sometimes shortened to shudo. Waka is the word for young, shu can sometimes mean companions, and do means way or path. The younger men in the relationship were called wakashu, while the older men were known as nenja. That word is composed of nen, which combines the senses of solicitude, desire, and attention, and one of the words for person.

Those familiar with things Japanese will have already picked up that this practice was thought to be a do, in the same way that budo is the way of the warrior. The same kanji also crops up in kendo, kyudo, judo, aikido, and even Shinto.

Kendo literally means the way of the sword. Perhaps wakashudo represented a different form of swordsmanship!

Afterwords: Some of the information on waksashudo came from this website. The creator asks that this form of citation be used: Andrew Calimach, World History of Male Love, “Homosexual Traditions”, The Beautiful Way of the Samurai, 2000. There you go. The site is well done and has links that are worth following, so I’ve added it to the right sidebar. The link to the Hagakure is already there.

The author of the first website suggests that the influence of Western Christian ideas conveyed through missionaries and after the Meiji Restoration, “a direct result of the opening of Japan carried out under the threat of American guns in 1854”, spelled the end of wakashudo. I’m not sure I agree. Some say that prostitution was outlawed for (ultimately) the same reasons, but men today interested in purchasing those services won’t have any trouble finding them. The same cannot be said of wakashudo, though men of any country today with means, power, and those sexual preferences are probably able to indulge themselves just as easily as Lord Shingen.

Update: My passing reference to yabusame drew some interest, and reader Tomojiro sent along this Youtube clip of a BBC report on the art/discipline. Give credit where credit is due: there’s a lot of worthwhile information and video, and it’s light on the snark. Thanks Tomojiro!

Memo to the AP: Words mean things

ERIC TALMADGE writes a brief and generally bland article for the Associated Press about the contemporary role of the Japanese military that is presented here by the International Herald Tribune. The latter is owned by the New York Times, which means we’re dealing with a tag team combination of media giants whose clout and credibility are rapidly evaporating due to self-inflicted wounds.

The article itself is harmless for the most part, describing the changing role of the Self-Defense Forces for a readership that generally doesn’t pay much attention to the subject. Mr. Talmadge mentions the mission in Iraq, the refueling operations in the Indian Ocean in support of NATO in Afghanistan, and the two ships sent to help deal with the Somalian pirates. In other words, it’s standard newspaper fare that can run whenever there’s a need to fill space.

Except for two sentences. Here’s the first:

Still, the new, more aggressive, role of Japan’s military is hard to ignore.

He uses the word “still” because it follows a statement from an officer that Japan’s military mission remains a defensive one. But what is this new “aggressive” role?

Mr. Talmadge doesn’t say. In fact, the body of the article describes precisely the opposite. He tells us that the 600 troops in Iraq were non-combatants. He notes that Japan does not have an aircraft carrier or the ability to conduct long-range air strikes because they are not compatible with a defensive posture. He informs us that the Chinese outspend the Japanese on military expenditures–and that Chinese spending grows by double-digit percentage points annually, while Japanese spending remains flat. He accurately reports that many Japanese would oppose sending combat troops to places such as Afghanistan.

Apparently the AP style manual has a definition for the word “aggressive” that has eluded the rest of the world’s lexicographers.

Here’s the second sentence:

Japan’s two biggest parties both advocate taking a higher profile on the world stage, largely for nationalistic reasons.

What are these “nationalistic” reasons? Mr. Talmadge doesn’t say that either.

He also doesn’t say that the primary opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, did not support the three primary military operations he mentions. In fact, the DPJ tried to employ their upper house majority to try to end the Indian Ocean refueling operations as a means to oust the ruling Liberal Democratic Party from power.

Indeed, the leader of the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro, is well-known for opposing any Japanese military operations other than those for strictly defined defensive purposes unless they are in the context of a greater United Nations effort.

So what is “nationalist” about the country with the second-largest economy in the world and a population greater than any EU member casting off the role of international wallflower and pursuing what it believes to be its interests? Would Mr. Talmadge have us believe that Japan is not entitled to behave in the manner of every other country in the world? That Japan’s national interests are anything other than benign, particularly as compared to three of the countries in its immediate neighborhood? That the country should just pipe down, continue to churn out Toyotas for the globe, and serve tea at international conferences while the real leaders of the world continue to make a hash of things?

But then we’ve known for a while that both the AP and the New York Times have a distorted grasp of the meaning of “nationalist”, especially when applied to Japan.

On the other hand, perhaps I’m being too harsh. Growing numbers of American newspapers are severing their ties with AP, or intend to do so, and the Times’s problems, both journalistic and financial, are common knowledge.

It would seem their lack of understanding involves much more than the definition of two ill-chosen words.

Japan-India space alliance raises eyebrows

ONE PLANK of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s foreign policy was to forge closer ties with regional free market democracies, including Australia and India. While there is nothing inherently unusual about such alliances–indeed, they are natural–the idea raised some eyebrows in Chinese circles, for geographical reasons alone.

Mr. Abe didn’t stay in office long enough to make any headway in formalizing such an alliance, but Japan and India continued to discuss their mutual interests. These discussions bore fruit last month when the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) agreed to expand cooperation for disaster management.

As this article in the Asian Times by Peter J. Brown notes:

Japan has been using its weather satellites to provide free weather data to countries throughout Asia for many years without any hint of controversy, but this is quite different from deploying a new generation of surveillance satellites to monitor disasters.
Virtually all existing satellite-based multinational disaster management initiatives such as the “International Charter, Space and Major Disasters” depend upon the ability of the signatories to engage in the rapid tasking of their respective surveillance satellites. In other words, quickly altering the flight patterns of the surveillance satellites in question so they zoom right over a disaster zone is essential to the success of the mission at hand.

And the capability to alter the flight patterns of surveillance satellites means that the satellites have an obvious potential for dual use.

The article states that the Chinese are wondering if the United States is behind this cooperative venture and are using it as a means of containing them. Perhaps that is the case, but it is also true that the Japanese and Indians are more than capable of coming up with the idea on their own, and have the incentive to do so.

Mr. Brown fills a limited space with a lot of information, and the resultant lack of focus makes the article difficult to read. He quotes several people who are following regional events, but not all of them are convincing. For example:

Dr Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the Department of National Security Studies at the US Naval War College, does not believe the Japan-India space relationship is picking up steam. “The consensus-driven decision making process used in Japan means that pretty much everything moves at a glacial pace,” said Johnson-Freese.

Dr. Johnson-Freese should be in a position to know, but she doesn’t account for the possibility that the Japan-India space ties could already have been under discussion for quite some time. She also overlooks the potential of the Japanese to move much more quickly than glacier speed when they’re concerned about their security. Satellites in the region can also monitor North Korean moves, for example.

Mr. Brown also quotes Dr. Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China project manager at the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists, about Chinese development of space:

While they would welcome the opportunity to be a competitive commercial space player, especially in the international launch services market where they have a strong advantage…

Perhaps I’m missing something, but if they have a strong advantage in the international launch services market, woundn’t they already have the opportunity to be competitive?

Says Dr. Johnson-Freese:

“China very much wants to be seen as both the leader of space efforts in Asia, and for developing nations. They are using their manned program to reap all the prestige awards it renders – which are considerable, if only in perceptions created – including that it is beating the US”.

Do people really think the Chinese are beating the Americans in a manned space program? The same Americans who flew to the moon and back 40 years ago and have been flying space shuttles for more than a quarter of a century?

But the article is still worth reading to gain an understanding of the growing Japanese interest in the possible military exploitation of space. Japan recently enacted the Space Basic Law, which incorporates considerations of the use of space for national security. And the Yomiuri Shimbun further revealed that the country is thinking of putting an early warning satellite into orbit that can detect the launch of enemy ballistic missiles.

It might be the case that the American input into Japanese strategic thinking is more limited than some suspect.