Shimojo Masao (14): The Senkakus Weren’t Taiwanese Territory Either
Posted by ampontan on Monday, February 7, 2011
THE HEADLINE on the article in the 23 December Sankei Shimbun leapt from the page: “The Senkakus (are) Chinese Territory: Old document sold for JPY 166 Million”. The article reported that it was proclaimed the old document contained conclusive proof identifying the Senkaku Islets (Chinese name: Diaoyutai) as Chinese territory. The document was put up for auction in Beijing, and the winning bid was CNY 13.25 million (about JPY 166 million). The auction attracted attention because the sponsors announced in advance that foreigners would be prohibited from bidding to prevent “the destruction of this conclusive evidence”.
The old document in question was identified as the Zhongshan Jili, Volume #5 of the Fusheng Liuji by Shen Fu, which was thought to be lost. This previously unknown document was said to have been recorded in the Jishizhu, which was abstracted by the Qing Dynasty scholar Qian Yong.
To start with the conclusion, not only does this JPY 166 million document fail to offer conclusive proof that the Senkakus are Chinese territory, the idea that a Japanese would purchase it “to destroy the conclusive proof” is a groundless concern.
Until now, the Chinese have used the records of Chinese emissaries sent to the Ryukyu Kingdom (today’s Okinawa Prefecture) since the Ming Dynasty era to assert that the Senkakus were historically Chinese territory. These records include the directions for a sea route. The name of the island of Uotsuri (Chinese name: Diaoyutai) was variously recorded as Chenkan in the Shiliuqiulu (1534), Guorulin in the Chongbian Shiliuqiulu (1562), Wangji in the Shiliuqiu Zalu (1683), Xubaoguang in the Zhongshan Yunxinlu (1719), Zhouhuang in the Liuqiu Guozhilue (1756), Lidingyuan in the Shiliuqiulu (1800), and Zhaikun in the Xuliuqiu Guozhilue (1808).
Then, in the fall of 2005, a copy of the Jishizhu was discovered in a Nanjing antiques market. Inside was an excerpt about the dispatch of an emissary to the Ryukyus in 1808 titled Celiuqiu Guojilue, that read, “Sighted Diaoyutai on the morning of the 13th.” Chinese and Taiwanese scholars regard the Celiuqiu Guojilue as part of the lost fifth volume (Zhongshan Jili) of the Fusheng Liuji. They claim it is proof the Diaoyutai islets were discovered 76 years before the discovery by the Japanese Koga Tatsushiro.
It is impossible to claim that the records of the Celiuqiu Guojilue immediately prove that Diaoyutai was Chinese, however. To be sure, the text does say there was the intent to establish a vassalage with the Ryukyu king in 1808, and that Zhai Kun was named the principal emissary and Fei Xi-zhang the secondary emissary. Both men did travel to the Ryukyus in 1808. The name Diaoyutai is recorded in the Liuqiu Guozhilue, which both men edited, as being on the route from Fuzhou to the Ryukyus.
To use the appearance of the name Diaoyutai on the sea route as the basis for making the claim that it is conclusive evidence proving the Senkakus are Chinese territory, however, is not possible. Zhai Kun himself did not recognize Diaoyutai as Chinese territory. In his poetry anthology Dongying Baiyong, he includes a poem recounting the trip from the port at Taiping to the port at Naha. The poem states that Mt. Jilong in Taiwan was the limit of Chinese territory at that time.
Zhai Kun set sail from Fuzhou in May 1808 and reached Naha on the night of the 17th, passing Wuhumen, Jilongshan, Diaoyutai, Chiweiyu, Heigouyang, Gumishan, and Machishan on the way. Recounting the trip, he writes that Mt. Jilong is located between Wuhumen and Diaoyutai, and that the mountain marks the outer border of China. He demonstrates the same geographical awareness in another of his poems when he writes that he “passed Mt. Jilong, the outer limit of China”. This enables us to confirm that Zhai Kun was aware that Mt. Jilong delineated the farthest boundary of Qing Dynasty China.
Why did Zhai Kun state that Mt. Jilong, in what was then Taiwan Prefecture, was the edge of China? Because the Qing Dynasty had established Taiwan Prefecture as a Chinese possession in 1684 and designated Mt. Jilong as the northernmost limit to their area of jurisdiction. The Taiwan Fuzhi, compiled every year during the reign of Emperor Kanxi by Jiang Yu-ying, states that the prefecture extends 2,315 li north to Mt. Jilong, That is echoed in the 1696 edition, when the same distance to the mountain is cited and the mountain is called the boundary.
In any event, the Jilong Castle near the present city of Keelung and Mt. Jilong are located that distance from Taiwan Prefecture, and were the outer limits of that prefecture. That’s the reason Zhai Kun writes in Dongying Baiyong that the mountain was the boundary of China, and that when he passed the mountain he passed outside of China. The Senkaku Islets, about 200 kilometers east-northeast of the northern edge of Taiwan at Keelung, were not included in the Qing Dynasty administrative district for which Mt. Jilong marked the border.
This fact can be confirmed in the Qinding Gujin Tushu Jicheng, a collection of maps published in 1728. Before Zhai Kun was sent as an emissary to the Ryukyus in 1808, the maps in that collection showed Mt. Jilong as the northern boundary of Taiwan Prefecture based on the text of the Taiwan Fuzhi. The Daiqing Yitongzhi published in 1744 shows the same thing. This geographical awareness is continued through the era of the Republic of China in the Huangzhao Xuwenxian Tongkao, compiled in 1912, and the Qingshigao of 1927. From the Ming Dynasty, through the Qing Dynasty, to the days of the Republic of China on the mainland, the Senkaku Islets were not part of Taiwan’s territory.
The definitive proof is that on maps showing the sea route when the emissaries were sent to the Ryukyus, the islands of Huapingdao and Pengjiadao were incorporated as part of Taiwan. In the Jilong Shizhi, a report from the city of Jilung in 1951, it is stated that a 1905 reorganization placed Mt. Jilong, Mt. Pengjia, Mt. Mianhua, and Mt. Huaping within the territory of the city of Jilung. The Senkaku Islets are nearly 150 kilometers to the east-northeast of Mt. Huaping, Mt. Pengjia, and Mt. Mianhua. It is self-evident that when the Qing Dynasty took possession of Taiwan in 1684, the governing authority of Taiwan Prefecture extended only to Mt. Jilung.
The Chinese claim that the Senkakus were their territory is vague, lacks a historical basis, and is nothing more than a mistaken impression. The old document that has been declared to present conclusive evidence that the Senkakus are Chinese territory demonstrates, when examined, that the Senkakus were not Chinese territory at all. There are reports an enormous sum was paid for the document to prevent the Japanese from destroying this “conclusive evidence”, but we don’t want to destroy the evidence showing the Senkakus were not Chinese territory.
In recent years China has become emotional about the Senkakus issue, and it has built up its military capabilities, intimidating other countries. That is the height of folly, because neither China nor Taiwan has any historical basis enabling it to claim the islets. Ignoring those historical facts, Japan’s Democratic Party government assigned about 100 members of a coastal surveillance team to Yonaguni Island near the Senkakus on 21 November to use radar for detecting Chinese ships and aircraft, while deliberations were ongoing regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines. To counter this move, the Chinese immediately dispatched two fishing patrol vessels to the area near the Senkakus, sailing for many hours near Japanese territorial waters.
An extreme overreaction of this type is not a wise choice. It is not too late for the Chinese to reexamine their awareness of history and discover the errors before both Japan and China become emotional. As with South Korea, which continues to illegally occupy Takeshima with no historical basis, China does not offer a historical ground for their assertion that the Senkakus belong to them.
Since the Democratic Party took power in Japan, the country’s diplomacy has been thrown into confusion, amplifying the instability of East Asia as a whole. While the lack of ability of the people in leadership positions in the DPJ administration is one factor, the LDP too, which had reigned as the ruling party until then, had a negative approach to resolving territorial issues.
What the people seek from politicians is the assurance of national sovereignty and stability in their daily lives. Part of the territory of postwar Japan has been invaded by neighboring countries, and this situation remains unresolved after more than half a century. Such a situation is tantamount to slavery. While we live contentedly in conditions of slavery, the political dramas of past and present only for the dogged pursuit of the seat of power have been a disgrace. If neither the DPJ nor the LDP has the wisdom to recover our national sovereignty after repeated invasions, they should promptly quit the political stage.
- Shimojo Masao
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Jeffrey said
Don’t have it at hand at work here, but I’m pretty sure I’ve got text books on the Ryukyus from grad school days discussing the Chinese ceding the islands, which include the Senkakus some time in the 19th century and that the communist government reaffirmed this again in the 1950s. Perhaps you have the references.
Everyone understands that they only reason the Chinese now have interest in these “islands” is because the potential oil wealth there.
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J: Thanks for the note.
I did a long post on that same subject with many of those references when the incident first occurred. It’s here, if you want to read it.
Also, click on Prof. Shimojo’s tag at the end of the post. His previous post (13, I think) is also about the Senkakus.
Yoroshiku!
- A.
Michael Turton said
Great stuff, thanks.
PaxAmericana said
re: “Part of the territory of postwar Japan has been invaded by neighboring countries, and this situation remains unresolved after more than half a century.”
Is the US a neighboring country? I would say the whole country is still under US occupation, it’s just that various interest groups are in on the deal. Making an issue out of the Northern Territories or the island disputes with China and Korea are distractions from the real topic of sovereignty that Shimojo Masao refers to. But I certainly agree that neither the LDP nor the DPJ can get Japan back to an independent and strong position. Then again, it’s unclear that this is what the Japanese public want.
Also, I’m not sure about Jeffrey’s argument that it’s all about oil for the Chinese. A big issue is that they were on their knees since the Opium Wars, and now want to go back to being treated as a great country. China as a “great country” is a bit awkward for Japan, particularly with the big brother relationship with the US, which views the world as its oyster. The coast off the Koreas is an example of this contention.
Nicholas Allott said
“Great stuff”, Michael? Really? Have you read the last paragraph? As far as I can make out, it claims that South Korea’s holding of the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima) — a few disputed rocks in the sea between Korea and Japan — “is tantamount to slavery” for the Japanese. Whatever you might think about who really owns them, it should be evident that this kind of rhetoric is a sign of the extreme right in Japan: with historical links to militarism and fascism (and note the coded claim that “What the people seek from politicians is the assurance of national sovereignty and stability in their daily lives.”)
All that should cast severe doubt on the accuracy of the historical analysis in the piece.
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NA:
Thanks for the comment.
If I understand you correctly, then Margaret Thatcher + Falklands also would = “extreme right”.
Then again, some might say that only those on the extreme left would find a wish to uphold national sovereignty objectionable when two countries illegally occupy parts of one’s own country, regardless of the square meters involved. If Cuba decided it had a claim on the Florida Keys, and Russia decided that the Aleutians were theirs after all, and they acted on it, would an American effort to drive them back be an act of the “extreme right”?
I also note your assertion that disagreement with someone’s philosophy is grounds for rejecting their scholarship. Prof. Shimojo reads classical Chinese, by the way. Do you? Click on his tag and take a look at the photo he sent of one of the maps he discusses in his previous post.
Yoroshiku!
- A.
slim said
I think he means what he says when he says “claims that South Korea’s holding of the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima) — a few disputed rocks in the sea between Korea and Japan — ‘is tantamount to slavery’ for the Japanese. Whatever you might think about who really owns them, it should be evident that this kind of rhetoric is a sign of the extreme right in Japan.”
How do you make the leap to Thatcher on this?
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S:
If you want to ask about leaping, ask that poster.
If you want to seen a analogy, Takeshima = Falklands. One was illegally invaded by South Korea, the other was illegally invaded by Argentia. The rhetoric is different.
Actually, the situations are somewhat different, too. Japan’s claim on Takeshima is legitimate and has nothing to do with maintaining the vestiges of colonialism. They also don’t have to contend with Corean mythomania.
- A.
Nicholas Allott said
A: Thank you for the comments. I didn’t notice until just now that there had been more activity on this thread after I posted.
I don’t see the analogy to the Falklands, as far as slavery is concerned. The inhabitants of the Falklands were in danger from a rather nasty dictatorship (even nastier than Thatcher’s regime: quite an achievement). There are no Japanese inhabitants of Liancourt/Dokdo/Takeshima. So who is enslaved? Obviously we are meant to think that South Korea’s holding of these rather barren rocks somehow destroys the freedom of Japanese people in general. That is deliberately incendiary rhetoric, intended to kindle the feelings that it claims to report.
I also did not assert “that disagreement with someone’s philosophy is grounds for rejecting their scholarship. ” My point was (just as I said) that militaristic, extreme-right rhetoric should “cast severe doubt on the accuracy of the historical analysis”. I did not say anything about the ability to read the documents in the literal sense: ‘what does this character mean?’ etc.. What I was urging caution about is the analysis: the selection of sources, the selection of quotations from the sources, the weighing up of their relative importance etc. And I said that the rhetoric “casts severe doubt” on this, not that it proves it to be worthless. Indeed the analysis in the article might turn out to be impeccable, but the only way to find out is to begin by doubting, consult other authorities (hopefully finding some who are less parti pris) and compare.
What I am suggesting is just common sense, really. If a Maoist historian says that the sources prove that Mao never killed anyone, it would be wise to seek a second opinion, no matter how competent a linguist he/she might be. The same for a far-right nationalist (from any country) claiming that the documents just happen to show that some bit of territory belongs to their country.
My personal opinion, by the way, is that China doesn’t own the Diaoyutai/Senkaku is. anymore than it owns Taiwan or Tibet. I reserve judgment on Japan’s claim: it looks to be founded on the same dubious kind of grounds that European countries used to use to claim various bits of land around the world. Most of those bits of territory have been taken (or handed) back into local control, rightly. Here it’s not clear what that would mean since there are no inhabitants.
One can dream of an East Asian Community of partner nations where borders are easily crossed, trust is increased and the importance of ownership claims fades as a consequence. Nationalists on all sides, for ideological reasons, prefer to treat territorial claims as zero-sum; and their rhetoric is designed to reduce trust and increase the likelihood of conflict.
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NA: Thanks for the reply. Since you are dubious of the grounds for the Japanese claim, you can take the question up with me directly after you read this. After writing this, I discovered another PRC map that says the Senkakus are Japanese territory (that the Pentagon turned up) but didn’t include it here.
False equivalence, as you’re no doubt now aware after reading the piece at the above link.
Why would one do that, ignoring both biology and the real world precedent of a profoundly undemocratic EU? And not everyone in the EU thinks the idea of easily crossing borders is a good idea, for very good reasons.
All territorial claims–indeed, all territorial demarcations–are as a matter of definition zero-sum. Are you suggesting shared territory is a realistic alternative?
Incidentally, it is the Japanese who have suggested sharing the area’s
resources. That is unacceptable to the Chinese.
It seems to me that you’re afraid of a ghost while ignoring a very real monster.
- A.
Tony said
A. I agree, territory is generally a zero-sum game. Producing more maps and ancient documents showing anything other than China’s contention is irrelevant to China and will be discredited and failing that, ignored. It’s like arguing with religious fundamentalists, logic and proof are not part of the equation because they have belief. The question is what can Japan do about this? As far as I can see, they can do very little other than they have done I’m afraid. This issue will continue on until Japan either decides to give up the islands (not likely), Japan fights for them (not likely) or China gives up any claim on them (not likely).
Nicholas Allott said
I wrote, “Japan’s claim … looks to be founded on the same dubious kind of grounds that European countries used to use to claim various bits of land around the world.”
I meant the doctrine of ‘terra nullius’: the legal fiction that said that the first modern nation to stick a flag in some territory gets it.
Your article seems to agree: “The Japanese claimed the islands under the legal principle of terra nullius— any nation can claim as its own, territory that is unclaimed by any other nation”
So the disagreement is not over the grounds involved but over the desirability of the doctrine. I think that it was in nearly all cases a barely concealed excuse for imperial landgrabbing, some of the unpleasant consequences of which are still being worked out decades and centuries later.
A wrote: “All territorial claims–indeed, all territorial demarcations–are as a matter of definition zero-sum.”
But that is not so (as I think you acknowledge with “Are you suggesting shared territory is a realistic alternative?”), unless you assume that everything must be owned by one and only one nation (or legal person, in the sub-national context). And that assumption is simply false: we all — and in a sense none of us — own the high seas and outer space. The Antarctic Treaty gives another example. And in the sub-national context there were and are many examples of common land. In a sense, terra nullius is the international version of the kind of landgrab that was known in some countries as ‘enclosure’: the seizing of land previously used by all in a community, again on the assumption that everything must have one and only one owner. In such processes it is always the powerful who end up in possession.
Note, though, that I was not advocating shared ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai is.. Rather I suggested that for more immediate ways of decreasing tension one could look to supranational partnerships, as in Europe — or for that matter SE Asia, or South America.
On this A wrote: “Why would one do that, ignoring both biology and the real world precedent of a profoundly undemocratic EU? And not everyone in the EU thinks the idea of easily crossing borders is a good idea, for very good reasons.” (linking to an article on fortress Europe)
I have no idea what biology is supposed to do with international relations. On the demerits of the EU, including various democratic deficits and ‘fortress Europe’ I agree. But I wasn’t calling the EU a panacea, rather I was advocating this sort of structure as a way of lowering tension over territorial claims (crucial, since they provide flashpoints for wars) and of lowering the importance to ordinary people of who owns what (since all EU and EEA citizens can go anywhere within the whole). Freedom of movement is a good. We should applaud when it is increased (as it has been for people within the EU); worry and complain when it is decreased (as it has been to some extent by the adoption of ‘fortress Europe’ policies).
A wrote: “Incidentally, it is the Japanese who have suggested sharing the area’s resources. That is unacceptable to the Chinese.”
Any offer to share is laudable. I hold no brief for the Chinese government.
A wrote: “It seems to me that you’re afraid of a ghost while ignoring a very real monster.”
If by ‘monster’ you mean the Chinese government I agree, and I don’t say anyone should ignore it, although I would add that I don’t think that it has any territorial ambitions towards populated bits of Japan — very much unlike its attitude to Taiwan, and perhaps to part of India. So Japan needs to keep a wary eye on China and try to build peace and understanding (helped, one hopes, by the long-established and deep commercial ties).
And I guess that by ‘ghost’ you mean Japanese nationalism, and here again I agree, but only if we accept that it is an evil ghost that still haunts Japan, and whose followers are constantly trying to conjure it back into life. Friends of Japan have a duty, in my opinion, to help progressive forces in Japan to exorcise the spirit. Such an exorcism would transform Japan’s relations with its neighbours (cf post-war Germany), and, perhaps more importantly, would improve the self-perception of Japanese people: the way that they tend to see themselves relative to the human race as a whole (again cf post-war Germany).
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NA:
Did you read the post? In this case it clearly wasn’t. A merchant had to bug the government about the islands for 10 years to get them to pay attention.
Sorry, writing too fast. “Evolutionary biology”
We don’t accept that. That’s a dead issue. The ghost is haunting you, not Japan. For example, the Japanese had a chance to vote for a small party, some of whom are apologists, in last year’s election. Very few did. They won no seats, even with proportional representation. Communists and Social Democrats (ex-Socialists) did. Japanese nationalism as a virulent force in East Asia (or in Japan) is dead.
1. The only effect it would have on Japan’s relations with its neighbors would be to encourage its neighbors to behave even more obnoxiously. I’ve argued this extensively here, with specific examples. One example is former Chinese President Jiang in a speech to the Chinese diplomatic corps in the 90s telling them that they have to use the issue of the war in bilateral relations “forever”. It came to light when his speeches were translated into English.
2. As for Japanese self-perception, this “ghost” has had the opposite effect, if any. It is no coincidence that few countries anywhere have behaved as well internationally since 1945 as Japan.
And what is this about how the Japanese people see themselves relative to the human race as a whole?
Please understand that I do not mean to be rude, but I have to wonder if any time you’ve spent in Japan has been very long, or has been spent talking or interacting much with the Japanese equivalent of John and Jane Doe.
- A.
Nicholas Allott said
A: thanks for the responses.
The discussion is going in several different directions. I’ll try to be brief.
I read the linked post. As I guess you know, the willingness or otherwise of imperial actors to seize particular bits of territory (by terra nullius, or war, or otherwise) varied depending on calculations of expediency. (e.g., famously, the British empire’s shift from annexing territory — India, Africa — to controlling trade as in South America in the 19th c.). Typically there are parties within imperial powers that push for annexation, perhaps against resistance from parts of bureaucracy/government (as with the sad story of Japan’s push into Manchuria, then China).
So I know all that, but my point is orthogonal to that: roughly what I meant was it’s a shame that these annexations of the imperial era (using unjust ‘principles’) have left us with so many territorial disputes that now need to be defused. Whether Japan’s claim stands in international law is dependent on tricky points about how unused and unvisited a territory had to be to count as ‘terra nullius’. Not being an expert on 19th c. international law, I reserve judgment, as I said. I doubt (but am not qualified to judge) whether any reluctance from the centre to take the territory bears either way on the legal question.
On Japanese nationalism I think we may have to agree to differ, although I partly agree about Japan’s foreign policy post-1945. I really think that the comparison with Germany is helpful, though.
My view is that ordinary discourse in Japan — in the media, and in personal conversations — often assumes a kind of racial essentialism. There’s also a cultural version: the famous ‘unique uniqueness’. These are not marginal views in the way that belief in an Aryan race is in Germany. There are right-wing crazies in both countries but in Japan there are senior politicians who sympathise and bolster such views. Not so in Germany. As a seasoned observer of Japan I’m sure that you know that there are links of sympathy between the black/white loudspeaker truck brigades and yakuza, and some of those links reach into parts of the LDP.
There is still enmity and resentment between (e.g.) Japan and Korea in a way that there isn’t between Germany and France. Nationalists on both sides stir it up, but, as always, the uglier nationalism is that of the former imperial master claiming that all his actions were well-intentioned, there were no victims, and that all sacrifices were justified etc. No mayor of Berlin could get away with the kinds of things Ishihara Shintaro has said.
(“I have to wonder if any time you’ve spent in Japan has been very long, or has been spent talking or interacting much with the Japanese equivalent of John and Jane Doe.”
Yes, and yes.)
I’m still not getting the connection between evolutionary biology and the EU, I’m afraid.
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My 27th anniversary comes next month, and I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of times I’ve seen a hyper-nationalist sound truck. Heard them in full blast twice, maybe three times. I suspect that’s largely a Tokyo phenomenon, and I don’t live there.
Estimates of zainichi in the yakuza range from 10% to 30%, BTW. I wrote about it recently; perhaps it’s still on the first page.
The one in the Senkakus doesn’t have to be defused as a territorial issue, because it isn’t a territorial issue. You now know this after reading the post. The Chinese for decades recognized it as Japanese territory, even in the 30s when they claimed other islands held by Japan and France. The People’s Daily wrote articles about it saying it was Japanese. Both the PRC and Taiwan made maps saying it was Japanese.
It is a geopolitical issue, not a territorial issue. The largest country in the world is clearly trying to reestablish its hegemony, doesn’t give a fig for democratic processes or the rule of law, and you’re still worried about a ghost.
I don’t know about Berlin, but the US has a President who talks about his own grandmother as a “typical white person” (who helped raise him and helped get him into an exclusive prep school), “bitter clingers”, and who allowed his children to sit in the pews of Jeremiah Wright’s church and pretended he didn’t know what was going on, even though he claimed attendance for 20 years.
I see no difference and no reason to single out some Japanese.
Tokyo, by the way, had a rather leftist mayor in the 70s (I think), and Ishihara is really the original (AFAIK) Japanese celebrity candidate.
- A.
Andrew in Ezo said
“There’s also a cultural version: the famous ‘unique uniqueness’.”
_ _ _ _ _
People like to go off on the supposed Japanese obsession with cultural uniqueness, but I would say the biggest perpetrators of this behavior are my fellow Americans- it is in fact part of our identity. From an early age, in both school and in society in general, we are told we are the beacon of the world (city on the hill and such), that all the downtrodden seek to emulate us, and consequently, we have nothing to learn from the rest of the world- “the American way is the best way and the ONLY way”. I even catch myself, in moments of frustration in daily life, about to utter in the typically American manner: “in America we have such and such- I don’t understand why they don’t do it here…” When I nevertheless do utter it, I invariably feel shame later.
Tony said
A,
While I’ve never seen a sound truck here I did see many when I lived in Himeji, Osaka, Nagoya, and Nara. There the trucks were daily occurrences, particularly if you were in the downtown area or near a Korean school or Korean and Chinese Consulate. I’ve also seen them in Kumamoto though not nearly as common as on Honshu.
When does a geopolitical issue turn into a territorial issue? Clearly it depends on the perspective of the players involved. From the Japanese perspective, the Chinese are using geopolitics as a means to expand their influence by laying claim to the territory. From the Chinese perspective though it is not so clear. The gov’t may be practicing geopolitics but they are presenting it to the Chinese people as solely a territorial issue. Additionally, I believe some members of the Chinese gov’t see this as a territorial issue and are using geopolitics to make it a territorial issue.
As for Zainnichi in the yakuza, Bill is correct. Many westerners like to paint the yakuza as a right wing organization but a recent book (Tokyo Vice) by written by Jake Adlestein says that NPA believe 10% – 30% of yakuza are ethnic Koreans. If true you can’t paint an entire yakuzaorganization as rightwing xenophobes when a significant minority of that group are non-Japanese. By the way, Adlestein is a former Yomiuri shinbun reporter (the Japanese daily, not the English one) and is the only foreigner to be admitted into the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Press Club. During his time with the Yomiuri he became somewhat of an expert on the yakuza as he spent a large chunk of his time as a crime reporter.