It never ends with sumimasen

CHRIS BURGESS, a lecturer at Tsuda College, offers his attempt to link common courtesy, apology, national identity, and Constitutional reform in this rather disorganized article published by (who else?) The Japan Times.

Prof. Burgess makes several dubious assertions along the way before reaching his destination. Here’s one:

“(T)he fact that apology and responsibility are not strongly related in Japanese discourse…”

When did this become a “fact”? It could just as easily be argued that apology and the acceptance of responsibility are synonymous in Japanese discourse.

“…something which may explain the failure to address compensation issues…”

He means compensation for World War II, an issue that was formally addressed and settled long ago with all the countries involved except North Korea.

A sincere apology can have a dramatic and positive impact on the image of both the speaker and the country they represent. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s apology to indigenous Australians in February was well received nationally and internationally.

Note the use of passive voice to avoid explaining that the apology was well-received by the segment of the population who wanted him to apologize to begin with. It was less well-received by the segment of the population who thought it was an empty gesture of moralistic preening.

The professor seems to think that there is such a thing as a national identity, and that some entity exists which can act to discover and have feelings about this identity:

As early as the 1970s, Japan had felt misunderstood, its abilities and contributions not duly appreciated. With the bursting of the bubble, this became a full blown identity crisis. That most dynamic of all modern industrial nations was no longer “No. 1,” and became riddled with uncertainty about its place in the world.

What is this “Japan” that had a “full-blown identity crisis” and was “riddled with uncertainty about its place in the world”? Is it animal, vegetable, or mineral? Or is it just a figment of the social scientist imagination?

And what is it that makes an identity crisis “full blown”? Did Japan seek counseling from Dr. WHO?

Regardless of whether the territory of identity is tangible or a faculty lounge construct, Prof. Burgess has pitched his tent there—it was the subject of his doctoral thesis.

But that’s not the real point of the article:

The insecurity about national identity has partly manifested itself in a growing sense of nationalism.

Thus the fictitous entity is given life as Frankenstein’s monster. Not only does it walk under its own power, it leaps over chasms of logic:

One example was the move for constitutional reform, something driven by the fact that the current constitution limits Japan’s exercise of hard power — that is, military power — to influence the behavior of others.

And:

…(M)any of those who push for a soft power approach are at the same time attempting to loosen the (constitutional) constraints on the application of hard power. Unfortunately, those who promote the latter, more coercive path risk damaging, not improving, Japan’s overseas image.

Let’s put aside the questions of why the Japanese Constitution should be the business of anyone overseas and why the legal basis of the state should be subject to their imaginations, and see if there is any factual basis for this premise about “hard power”.

Readers are cordially invited to provide three concrete examples backed by specific and original documentation in the Japanese language demonstrating that the people most involved in amending Article 9, the peace clause, are doing so with the intent of obtaining military power “to influence the behavior of others” and to take the “more coercive path”. These examples should also include specific instances in which the supporters would coerce other nations, and the reasons for that coercion.

The conditions: Self-defense in any form does not count as coercion, nor does superiority in either offensive or defensive weapons systems employed as a deterrent. Further, the examples must not come from people in the same organization, and the opinions of fringe groups are not allowed. (We all know fringe groups when we see them.)

Oh, and one more. No figments of the imagination, please.

Afterwords: Here’s another hole in the stocking–the belief in the existence of an entity capable of having a national identity crisis is more intrinsically nationalistic than the wish to amend a Constitution written during extraordinary circumstances under the supervision of a conquering army to allow for what every other nation in the world has: de jure, and not just de facto, self-defense capabilities.